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Abstract: The objective of this paper is to explain why certain authors – both 
popular and academic – are making a mistake when they attribute obligations 
to uncoordinated groups of persons, and to argue that it is particularly unhelpful 
to make this mistake given the prevalence of individuals faced with the difficult 
question of what morality requires of them in a situation in which there is a good 
they can bring about together with others, but not alone. I will defend two alter-
natives to attributing obligations to uncoordinated groups. The first solution has 
us build better people, who will coordinate their actions willingly and spontane-
ously when the occasion arises. The second solution has us build better groups, 
so that when the occasion arises, there is a framework in place for coordinating 
members into action.
Keywords: Collective obligation; Unstructured groups; Climate change; Bearers 
of obligations; Poverty; Non-collectives’ obligations; Humanitarian intervention.
1  Climate Change, Poverty, and ‘Our’ Obligations
Bestselling-author Naomi Klein argues that solving the global climate crisis 
requires global grassroots social activism (Klein 2014). Environmental activist 
and Guardian writer George Monbiot agrees, advocating widespread political 
mobilisation (Monbiot 2014). Climate ethicists Edward Page and Axel Gosseries 
argue that the primary obligations to mitigate climate change fall upon the group 
of those who have benefited most from industrialisation (Gosseries 2004; Page 
2012). These are all normative responses to the actual and prospective jointly-
caused harms of climate change. They have in common that they attribute obliga-
tions to groups of persons, but they are distinct from what are commonly referred 
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to as ‘collective obligations’ in that the groups to which they are attributed lack 
features that collectives have.
These kinds of attributions are made in response to other kinds of harms 
too. In the context of severe poverty, Martha Nussbaum argues that humanity 
is obliged to provide everyone with certain capabilities (Nussbaum 2007), Bill 
Wringe argues that the obligations to satisfy positive rights to subsistence fall 
on the global collective (Wringe 2005, 2014), and Peter Singer and Garrett Cullity 
both argue that the primary obligation to address poverty bears on the affluent 
as a group (Cullity 2004; Singer 2009). In the context of humanitarian military 
intervention, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine attributes obligations to 
intervene upon severe human rights violations to the international community 
(United Nations 2009; see also discussion in Pattison 2008).
It is tempting, of course, to move from the joint causation of harm to joint 
responsibility for harm, in the case of climate change, or from joint failures to 
provide assistance (causation by omission) to joint responsibility for failure to 
assist, in the case of extreme poverty (and similarly, from responsibility for joint 
failures to intervene militarily on humanitarian grounds, to joint responsibility 
for failure to intervene). But we do not make this move lightly even in the case 
where we are concerned only with the actions of a single individual: usually 
we want to know not merely whether she caused some harm, but whether she 
intended to cause it, or reasonably foresaw that she would cause it, or whether 
her causation of it was negligent or reckless (Miller 2007). In the case of joint 
causation it is even more complicated. Anthropogenic climate change was caused 
(and is being caused still) by the actions of millions of people over the many years 
since industrialisation, global poverty was caused (and is being caused still) by a 
complicated set of domestic and international actions and failures to act (Cohen 
2010). Many – if not most – of these actions would have made no difference to 
climate change, or poverty, taken in isolation (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; Lawford-
Smith forthcoming(b)). It is hard to see, then, how those actions could count as 
intentional, reasonably foreseen, negligent, or reckless.
The objective of this paper is to explain why those authors mentioned above, 
and others besides, are making a mistake when they attribute obligations to the 
particular groups of persons they do, and argue that it is particularly unhelpful 
to make this mistake given the prevalence of individuals faced with the genuine 
question of what morality requires of them in a situation in which there is a good 
they can bring about together with others, but not alone. Attributing obligations 
to such groups makes those obligation statements impotent: it requires action 
from something that cannot act. This is bad for all the familiar reasons that vio-
lating ‘ought implies can’ is bad (Ward Smith 1961). But it is also bad because 
it does not get us any further along in doing what the claims were presumably 
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meant to do, namely, explicating the normative implications of large-scale harms 
such as threatened by climate change, or present in global poverty. We should get 
our story straight, so that we can actually give useful advice that, if acted upon, 
would see those problems actually being addressed.1
Only in a very particular subset of cases, such as those to be discussed in 
Section 2 below, does identifying as a member of a group like ‘humanity’ or ‘the 
affluent’ make it clear what a particular individual needs to do. In many more 
cases, what any individual needs to do depends on coordination. Addressing 
either of climate change or poverty will require collective action. This does not 
mean jumping straight to a collective obligation, for the reasons I will go on to 
explain. This paper aims to answer the difficult question of what individuals 
should do when faced with a situation in which collective action is required 
but no collective capable of action exists. I will argue that there are two better 
answers (than the positing of obligations to non-collective groups of persons) to 
what is required in the face of climate change, poverty, and humanitarian inter-
vention: mutual responsiveness, and collective agency. The first solution has us 
work to increase our responsiveness to one another, so that we might coordinate 
our actions willingly and spontaneously when the occasion arises. The second 
solution has us work to form groups of a specific kind, so that when the occasion 
arises, there is a framework in place for coordinating members into action.
The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 I will present two interpre-
tations of claims about groups’ obligations, agreeing that one is plausible and 
setting aside the cases covered by that interpretation to focus in the paper on 
the other, and in Section 3 I will briefly clarify my terminology in distinguishing 
groups that are collective agents from non-collective groups. In Section  4 and 
1 A final further reason to discuss the plausibility of such groups’ obligations is that they are 
a solution to an important challenge to consequentialism. The challenge comes from cases in 
which some harm will come about as a result of many people’s actions, where it makes no dif-
ference to the outcome whether a particular person acts or refrains from acting. So long as the 
particular person would get something (enjoyment, entertainment) out of performing the action, 
she has a reason to perform it and no reason not to, but that is true of all such individuals, so 
all of them act and the harm is brought about. (To illustrate: one person more or less casting a 
vote in an election makes no difference, but if no one votes there will not be a legitimate govern-
ment.) One possible solution to this alleged embarrassment for consequentialism is to say there 
are group-based reasons to act or not act, because what the group does makes a difference even 
if what the individual does makes no difference. Shelly Kagan (2011) sets this solution aside 
because of the conflict that would arise between the reasons one has as an individual compared 
with the reasons one has as a member of a group, but he does not comment on what seems to be 
a bigger problem, namely giving reasons (duties, obligations) to the kinds of groups who seem to 
lack any ability to act on them (this problem also arises for Sartorio 2004).
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Section 5 I will present two apparently plausible reasons for thinking non-collec-
tive groups can have obligations, the first to do with reliable production of out-
comes, the second to do with responsibility for what one causes. I will give a quick 
summary of the case against non-collectives’ obligations at the end of Section 5, 
clearing the way for a focus on collective agents, and individuals’ duties to create 
them, in Section 6. There I defend the two solutions mentioned above, namely 
mutual responsiveness and collective agency. In Section 7 I will conclude.
2  Interpreting Claims about Groups’ Obligations
Neither Monbiot nor Klein sound like they are saying something particularly 
implausible when they speak or write about political mobilisation or grassroots 
social activism as the solutions to anthropogenic climate change or extreme 
poverty. Monbiot finished his 2014 SPERI Lecture by saying:
So you say to me, “Well what do we do instead? You produce these arguments against trying 
to save nature by pricing it, by financialisation, by monetisation. What do you do instead?” 
Well, ladies and gentlemen, it is no mystery. It is the same answer that it has always been. 
The same answer that it will always be. The one thing we just cannot be bothered to get off 
our bottoms to do, which is the only thing that works. Mobilisation. It is the only thing that 
has worked, the only thing that can work. Everything else is a fudge and a substitute and 
an excuse for not doing that thing that works. And that applies to attempts to monetise and 
financialise nature as much as it does to all the other issues we are failing to tackle.
The question is what ‘we’? ‘We’ cannot be bothered; ‘we’ need to stop making 
excuses; ‘we’ must mobilise. There are two ways to interpret this claim. The first 
is as ascribing an obligation (or set of obligations) to every person in the rele-
vant set. The relevant set here might be individuals passionate about environ-
mental activism, it might be all individuals remotely capable of activism whether 
they are passionate about the environment or not. Let us assume it is the latter. 
More important than how to demarcate the relevant set is whether obligations 
are being attributed to all members or only some, and to all unconditionally or 
only conditionally. If they are being attributed to all unconditionally, then what 
Monbiot is really saying is that every person remotely capable of environmental 
activism must perform actions that could plausibly be described as ‘mobilising’. 
The problem is that mobilising, like collectivising, is not something any person 
can do alone (I will talk about this more later in the paper). Furthermore, even if 
it was (let us say we counted a one-person protest, a one-person blockade, a one-
person defacing of a billboard, etc., as an act of mobilising) it is far from clear 
that it is true that every person ought to do those things. It might be enough that a 
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sufficient number of people in the relevant set perform the actions, which would 
create a collective action problem given the potential desires of some (or all) to 
be the ones exempted from the subset; it might be positively harmful for more 
people than necessary to perform the actions, say because they will get in each 
other’s way and hinder the attempt; and it might be futile for one or a mere few to 
act without wider support.2
To give a toy case to make the point, suppose you are with two friends, and 
the three of you come across a broken-down car in need of a push-start. It would 
take all three of you pushing to move the car, which is large, and stopped on 
a slight incline. But unfortunately you know the driver, who your two friends 
dislike immensely. While you chat with the driver about what happened, your two 
friends make it absolutely clear that they do not intend to help, and walk a little 
further down the road where they sit belligerently, shooting malicious glances 
back at the driver from time to time. It cannot be the case in such a situation that 
you should go alone to push ineffectually at the back of the car. It is true that it 
would be good if the three of you gave the car a push-start, and it is true that were 
the other two to push at the back of the car you should push too. But from neither 
of those does it follow that you have an unconditional obligation to push at the 
back of the car. What you ought to do – whether you ought to do anything at all – 
depends on what your two friends do. Such an obligation is at best conditional: if 
they do – or if they signal willingness to do – then you ought to do. Your obliga-
tion to act depends on the satisfaction of the conditional’s antecedent.
There are only two kinds of cases for which it follows straightforwardly that 
all persons in the relevant set must perform actions. The first is the kind of case 
in which it would take a contribution from every person to secure the good. For 
example, imagine that a local supermarket will prohibit the use of plastic bags in 
order to reduce the number of bags going to landfill only if none of its customers 
resist the change: any single complaint would result in the prohibition not being 
made. In that case when we say ‘the supermarket’s customers should not com-
plain’, we really mean ‘for every single one of the supermarket’s customers, it is 
the case that she should not complain’.
2 For discussion of cases structured in each of these ways, see my (Lawford-Smith 2012). Note 
that in that paper I am concerned with what is required of individuals who are members of 
genuine collective agents, asking how collectives’ obligations distribute to their members. I am 
 concerned in this paper with groups that do not count as collectives, and therefore do not bear 
collective  obligations in the first place. So the question here is not one about distribution, but 
those same structures (joint-necessity, threshold good, threshold-with-harm, incremental good) 
occur in thinking about the kinds of contributions that individuals would have to make together 
in order to secure some particular outcome.
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The second is the kind of case in which every person’s actions make a dif-
ference to the securing of the relevant good. INGOs have made huge efforts in 
recent years to communicate to individuals the good that their charitable dona-
tions will secure. Suppose that the Against Malaria Foundation were to make a 
claim of a similar flavour to Monbiot’s or Klein’s, for example they named a figure 
and asked that the global community donate it in order to provide enough Long-
Lasting Insecticidal Nets (LLINs) for everyone affected. This does not have the 
same structure as the plastic bags case, because there are a great number of dif-
ferent ways in which different constellations of individuals could make donations 
together amounting to the figure named by the Foundation, and on which at least 
some people would not have to donate anything at all. (Securing the end is one 
thing, securing it according to the optimally fair distribution is another). But it 
has a different structure that similarly permits the interpretation that all indi-
viduals should donate, namely that the world is a bit better for every individual 
who does so. The more funding that is provided – short of the figure named by 
the Foundation – the more LLINs can be distributed to those affected, and in turn 
the more malaria is prevented. So when the Against Malaria Foundation says ‘the 
global community should provide N billion dollars’ they are also saying ‘every 
person should make a donation – the more the better’.
If a case has either of the two structures just mentioned,3 then it is reason-
able to interpret the claim about an obligation of an uncoordinated group as 
being equivalent to a claim about the obligations of each member of that unco-
ordinated group.4 Whether poverty has this structure depends in large part on 
whether we think of it as a holistic problem (‘global poverty’) or a cluster of local 
problems. On neither model would a solution require every person in the world 
to act. On the latter model it will sometimes be true that the more people who act, 
the better; and it will sometimes be false. In the wake of some natural disasters, 
3 I take it that these will be the only cases where it is reasonable to interpret the claim such, 
for the consequentialist reason that it being better if more people rather than less perform the 
 action is the explanation of why all ought to perform it (unless the alternative explanation holds, 
namely that the good outcome is tied to all performing it). But a non-consequentialist may  resist 
this conclusion on the grounds that there are some cases where people have duties to act even 
if their action would not make a morally relevant difference to the outcome. For example, a 
non-consequentialist may wish to interpret the claim “left-leaning Scots should vote Green!” as 
being equivalent to the claim that any left-leaning Scot should vote Green (regardless of what the 
 others are doing, regardless, even, of whether the election is already won, or already lost). For 
such people, this will provide a further kind of case in which non-collective obligation claims are 
equivalent to claims about all members of the non-collective. 
4 Peter French endorses this interpretation of claims about the obligations of uncoordinated 
groups in (French 1975) and (French 1979, p. 210).
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for example, the challenge to relief efforts is not raising enough money via dona-
tions, but rather organisations getting through to provide the necessary support 
(facing difficult logistical challenges, bypassing corrupt governments, etc.). In 
such cases it will not be true that the more people who donate, the better. Climate 
change is not such that it requires every person in the world to act, and neither is 
it necessarily such that the more people who act the better (see discussion in Law-
ford-Smith forthcoming(b)). At least when it comes to taking actions to reduce 
personal greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, or undertaking political actions in 
order to change our government’s environmental policy, we come face to face 
with the futility problem. What we need to do is act together, not for any one 
person to act regardless of what everyone else does.
Thus in the rest of the paper I will set aside all the cases in which it is plausi-
ble to read an attribution of an obligation to a non-collective group as shorthand 
for attributing obligations to every member of the group, and I will focus on the 
cases in which it would be futile for members of the non-collective group to act 
alone, or in which the actions of a subset of the members would be sufficient to 
securing the good, or in which the actions of more than a subset of the members 
would create an obstacle to securing the good. In cases such as these, we are left 
with a problem in making sense of the attribution of an obligation to that group. 
I will argue that the attribution itself is a mistake.
3  What Kinds of Groups Can Bear Obligations?
Many people accept that there are some groups which can be the bearers of 
obligations. The first question to ask is what separates a group which can be the 
bearer of obligations from a group which can not be. The next is which camp 
groups like those mentioned earlier – ‘humanity’, ‘the global collective’, ‘the 
affluent’, ‘the global community’ – fall into. The usual way to answer the first 
question is to defend some set of conditions for collective agency, such that 
when a group meets those conditions it can be the bearer of obligations, and 
when it does not it can not. Because ‘ought implies can’, groups have to be able 
to fulfill the alleged obligations in order for those obligations to actually bear 
on them. The conditions for collective agency are supposed to capture what it 
would take for a group to be able to fulfill obligations. There are many propos-
als (e.g. Held 1970, p. 479; Preda 2012), out of which I find the most plausible – 
although needing some important modifications – to be those in (Pettit and 
Schweikard 2006). They say: “A group of individuals will constitute an agent, 
plausibly, if it meets conditions like the following. First, the members act jointly 
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to set up certain common goals and to set up a procedure for identifying further 
goals on later occasions. Second, the members act jointly to set up a body of 
judgments for rationally guiding action in support of those goals, and a proce-
dure for rationally developing those judgments further as occasion demands. 
And third, they act jointly to identify those who shall act on any occasion in 
pursuit of the goals, whether they be the group as a whole, the members of 
the group individually, certain designated members, or certain agents that the 
group hires” (Pettit and Schweikard 2006, p. 33).
This set of conditions is overly strong, in that it requires individuals to ‘act 
jointly’ at each stage, which in turn requires each individual to have the intention 
that the group produce a particular end, the intention to do their bit in the pro-
duction of that end, the belief that each of the others intends to do her bit in the 
production of that end, and the intention of doing their bit because of that belief 
(Pettit and Schweikard 2006, p. 23). But surely one individual can act as, for, or 
on behalf of the group, so that the conditions for collective agency can be fulfilled 
without requiring joint action at each stage.
With the required modifications, designed to weaken the conditions in the 
direction just mentioned, the conditions (which I take to be necessary) will be:
1. An individual (alone or together with others) establishes: a set of non-con-
flicting goals that are intended to be common, and a procedure for assigning 
roles whose fulfillment will enable the pursuit of those goals.
2. At least two individuals (usually including the individual(s) in 1.), intend the 
goals, the procedure, and the outputs of the procedure to bear upon their 
own decision-making goals and procedures.
3. At least one individual from 2. or 1. assigns roles – to the individuals in 2. and 
in accordance with the procedure in 1. – whose fulfilment will enable the 
pursuit of the goals in 1.
Forming such a group is not particularly arduous; the most important thing is the 
intention of the individuals in 2. to take the outputs of the group’s decision-mak-
ing procedure into account in their own decision-making. This does not mean 
the group’s decisions have to have trumping weight. 2. might be met even if the 
individual considers fulfilling his role as a member of the group but ultimately 
decides to purse a project more important to him personally.5
5 Note that both the original conditions and this modified version require a group decision-mak-
ing procedure. See (Collins 2013, p. 244) for another alternative formulation of the original Pettit 
and Schweikard conditions. For the view that groups other than those with a shared decision-
making procedure can have obligations, see (Feinberg 1968; Held 1970); for the view that indi-
viduals should act as if they were in such a group see (Woodard 2007, Ch. 4 and 5).
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It is clear that the kinds of groups mentioned earlier (again: ‘humanity’, 
‘the global collective’, ‘the affluent’, ‘the global community’) will not meet the 
modified conditions proposed above (nor do they meet the original Pettit and 
 Schweikard conditions), and therefore do not count as collective agents.6 If it 
were clear-cut that only collective agents could bear obligations then this would 
be the end of the discussion. But I want to take up the challenge in Wringe 
(2014, p.  174–177), to not simply take it as self-evident that only agents can be 
the bearers of obligations. Several authors have denied that there must be col-
lective agency before there is collective (or at least ‘joint’) obligation. Explicit 
defenders of this view include Bill Wringe (2010, 2014), Felix Pinkert (2014, forth-
coming), Anne  Schwenkenbecher (2013, 2014), and David Killoren and Bekka 
Williams (Killoren and Williams 2013). I take the most interesting and difficult 
challenge to come from the cases discussed by Virginia Held (1970) and Steph-
anie Collins (2013), which I discuss in the next section under the label of ‘mutual 
responsiveness’.
In what follows, I will discuss what I take to be the strongest argument in 
favour of non-collectives’ obligations. I will argue that ultimately, the most plau-
sible cases can be explained in terms of individuals’ obligations to act respon-
sively, and that we should dismiss talk of non-collectives’ obligations in favour of 
(a) individuals’ obligations, to be responsive and/or to form collectives capable 
of acting in pursuit of the relevant goods, and (b) collectives’ obligations (once 
formed) to pursue those goods.
4   Spontaneous Coordination and Mutual 
Responsiveness
In the next two sections I want to talk about a couple of sequences of reasoning 
that I think partially explain the thought that non-collectives can bear obliga-
tions. In this section I will focus on a sequence that goes as follows. Sometimes 
outcomes are brought about by the cumulative actions of individuals, and on 
some theories of action the bringing about of that outcome by the non-collective 
will be classified as a non-collective’s action.7 Actual implies possible a fortiori, 
so if ‘ought implies can’ were to be read as requiring only unrestricted  possibility, 
6 From here I will use ‘collectives’ instead of ‘collective agents’, and ‘non-collectives’ for groups 
not meeting these conditions.
7 See the more detailed discussion of action in Section 5.
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then these actions of non-collectives would be candidates for obligatoriness, 
namely, to be such that they ought not to be performed, or such that if they are 
performed the non-collective is responsible after the fact for their performance. 
Now we need only to generate the in-principle obligation, for example, ‘univer-
sity students ought to protest against rising fees’. We check the outcome of uni-
versity students in fact protesting against rising fees against ‘ought implies can’ 
(on the weak reading) and notice that it is not knocked out. There we have a non-
collective’s obligation.
There are two versions of this step from actual to possible, and possible (plus 
desirable) to obligatory. One is implausible in a way that we can probably all agree 
on, and one is much more challenging. The implausible version goes as follows. 
A local cattle farm will go out of business if it receives orders from less than 60% 
of its regular customers this month (and this will be a good thing, in terms of 
methane emissions). Quite by chance, without coordination between its regular 
customers (who do not know each other), and as a low-probability confluence 
of different factors, those who would normally have ordered from the farm are 
each prevented from doing so: some fall sick, some have to travel, some are gifted 
produce from alternative sources, etc. (see also examples in Jackson 1987, p. 93). 
By fluke, ‘withhold custom sufficient to drive the cattle farm out of business’ 
became an action of the group’s. Because it was actual, we can see that it was 
possible; because it was possible, we can see that it would not have been ruled 
out as impossible if put forward as the content of an obligation of the group’s.8
A response to this reasoning can be given by way of a strengthening of ‘ought 
implies can’. Theorists interested in a possibility constraint for obligation do not 
usually – ever? – have in mind mere logical, metaphysical, or nomological pos-
sibility. A simple demonstration: one of the university students’ flatmates locks 
her in the bathroom on the day of the big fee protest, and her friend calls to say 
“where are you? You ought to be here protesting with us!” The student responds 
“I can’t! Tamati locked me in the bathroom”. It would be counterproductive for the 
friend to say “well you can, it’s perfectly consistent with the laws of nature that 
you be here rather than there right now”. The ‘ought implies can’ constraint is 
meant to knock out obligations in cases where the in-principle obliged individual 
lacks the ability, or the opportunity, to act (for a fairly recent survey, see Vranas 
2007). This more circumscribed account of ‘can’ that features in ‘ought implies 
can’ is specifically about agency. Properties such as ‘ability’ and ‘opportunity’ do 
not apply to non-collectives, because the counterfactuals usually used to assess 
8 A version of this reasoning appears in Gunnar Björnsson’s ‘Coinciding Clean Hands’ case 
(Björnsson 2014, p. 110), although he later explicitly rejects ‘mere chance’ as being sufficient to 
justify an obligation (Björnsson 2014, p. 114).
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whether they apply come out as nonsensical. Can the non-collective group ‘uni-
versity students’ protest? Let us see. Would it tend to succeed in protesting with a 
probability greater than 0.5 (or higher than a contextually-specified threshold) if 
it tried? Hard to say, for it is hard to say what its trying might involve. This invokes 
mental properties familiar from the case of individual agency, of which there are 
functional equivalents in the case of collective agency, but which are conspicu-
ously absent in the case of non-collective groups.
But what if we rejected this model of understanding groups’ abilities in a way 
analogous to our understanding of individuals’ abilities, and instead looked for 
something like reliable production? An action meets the ‘can’ constraint if, in a 
high proportion of nearby worlds, it would be performed. Returning to the example 
of the cattle farm, most of the counterfactuals that both hold the relevant features 
of the regular customers’ situation fixed and include the successful driving of the 
cattle farm out of business will come out as false, because a small amount of vari-
ation to the conditions will be enough to disturb the low-probability confluence 
of factors necessary to spontaneously producing that outcome. For example, bad 
weather might have seen some of the travel plans disrupted; sickness might have 
missed one or more customers or been less severe; etc. That is why the non-collec-
tive’s action just described is not particularly difficult to dismiss as a candidate for 
being obligatory. The action ‘can’ eventuate, but only flukily.
There is a much more challenging case, involving mutually responsive indi-
viduals, in which it looks like non-collective groups’ actions can arise reliably.
Consider the following, from Virginia Held (1970):
Assume that there are seven apparently normal persons in a subway car: none is acquainted 
with any other; none are sitting together. The second smallest person of the seven rises, 
pushes the smallest to the floor, and, in full view and hearing of the remaining five, pro-
ceeds to beat and strangle his victim. […T]he remaining five persons do nothing for, say, five 
minutes, at the end of which time interval the smallest person is dead. […N]o one of the five, 
acting alone, could have subdued him; it is extremely probable that action by two or more 
of the group to subdue him would have succeeded, with no serious injury to themselves; the 
group was not so numerous that, if each member had acted, confusion would have resulted 
(Held 1970, p. 476–477).
Held thinks that the persons in the subway car can be assumed to share the end 
of preventing the attack. Any reasonable person would want the attack to not be 
happening in the first place, anyone being attacked would want the bystanders 
around them to help them. She also thinks there is no particular mystery about 
what needs to be done. The assailant needs to be restrained; it does not matter 
very much how exactly that is achieved (whether the largest person pins his arm 
back and the second-largest sits on his legs, or whether it is the second-largest 
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who takes the arms, for example). Held has also made sure to eliminate any of 
the usual preventers of action, such as undue risk of being hurt, or hindering the 
rescue. Thus, the five persons in the subway car not involved in the attack have 
the obligation together to restrain the assailant and protect the victim, and if they 
fail, as they in fact do in the case as Held imagines it, they are culpable together 
for that failure. Her case generalises: accidents and attacks are often the kind of 
thing that can be assisted or prevented by persons acting together; it is usually 
reasonable to assume that persons will want assistance to be provided, and pre-
vention to be achieved; and it is usually more or less clear what needs to be done. 
In such cases, clusters of individuals can act together without being coordinated 
by one of their number (or an external agent) (see also the beach rescue case 
in (Collins 2013)). Felix Pinkert and Anne Schwenkenbecher have both argued 
with reference to Held’s case that groups of agents that are not themselves agents 
in their own right can yet be the bearers of obligations (Schwenkenbecher 2013, 
2014; Pinkert 2014).
Extrapolating from this, we can see that in certain kinds of (idealised) socie-
ties, non-collectives’ actions in pursuit of the good will be commonplace. All 
persons in such a society have strong commitments to particular values as a 
matter of character, integrity, or personal virtue. All persons in such a society 
are well-versed in what is required in situations where those values are com-
promised. Every now and then, a situation would arise in which individuals 
could advance the good only by acting together, and this situation would act as 
a kind of trigger: the persons in that society would simply step into the familiar 
roles and the situation would be resolved. To illustrate, imagine that members 
of a certain cultural group had internalised the value of being prepared to die 
to defend their own and others’ freedoms. Then imagine that this group is the 
subject of a civil war, and taken hostage in forced-labour camps by members of 
the dominant political group. Even without the capacity to communicate and 
so coordinate an uprising, we might imagine that all it would take for there to 
be an uprising is any single prisoner disobeying a rule or order: a single act of 
resistance could trigger similar acts of resistance in all other prisoners, because 
all other prisoners are prepared to die to protect their own and others’ freedoms, 
and the triggering action is sufficient to ‘coordinate’ others around that particu-
lar moment and location for the uprising. This shows that the adoption of differ-
ent moral norms by groups of persons – in this case unconditional/categorical 
rather than conditional/consequentialist – will affect the extent to which we 
judge that a non-collective can reliably perform an action. So non-collectives can 
act reliably. If that is all it takes to meet an alternative version of ‘ought implies 
can’ not modelled on human mental states, then non-collectives’ obligations are 
back in the picture.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 12/10/15 5:15 PM
What ‘We’?      237
But lest I have now made the case for non-collectives’ obligations look too 
promising, let me now turn to the problems. The first is that mutual responsive-
ness only works in a subset of the cases where we might want non-collectives’ 
obligations. It works (and sometimes works very well) in cases where everyone 
can be presumed to share an end, and where what each person needs to do is 
roughly the same (or where the differentiated roles are a matter of common aware-
ness). But arguably the most pressing contemporary case, namely widespread 
action against climate change, is not like that at all. Granted, there are things that 
individuals can do independently and unilaterally. But if we were to figure out 
what ideally ought to be done by ‘humanity’ (all people everywhere) and then 
distribute the roles necessary to see that achieved, the roles would surely have 
nothing like the content individuals come up with when acting independently 
and unilaterally (contra Jamieson 2007). Still, a subset is something – showing 
that mutual responsiveness does not lead to reliable fulfillment of ostensible 
non-collective obligations in all cases is not a major blow when the battle is being 
fought over whether there are any non-collective obligations at all. One option, 
obviously, would be to concede those cases, and modify the strong claim ‘non-
collectives cannot bear obligations’ to a weaker claim, ‘there are very few cases in 
which non-collectives can be the bearers of obligations’. I still prefer the stronger 
claim, as I hope the discussion makes clear.
Two responses are available to the challenge posed by this subset of cases. 
The first is to say that the conditions that make mutual responsiveness possible 
simply suffice for collective agency. The group of individuals is in fact coordinated, 
just in the rather unusual way structured by social norms and common knowl-
edge rather than by leaders or decision-making procedures. Referring back to 
the conditions outlined in Section 2, social norms and the broader social context 
would do the work of assigning ‘roles… whose fulfillment will enable the pursuit 
of the goals’; the facts about important values being compromised would do the 
work of ‘goals… intended to be common’, and the individuals’ dispositions toward 
being good people would take care of ‘intend[ing]… the goals, the procedure, and 
the outputs of the procedure to bear upon their own decision-making goals and 
procedures’. This would be to concede that there are the grounds for obligation in 
these cases of what looked like non-collectives’ actions (actions brought about by 
mutually responsive members), but to show that the grounds are there precisely 
because there actually is the kind of agency or agency-replacement necessary for 
a group to be the bearer of obligations. In such cases, the groups count as collec-
tives, rather than non-collectives.
The second, which I am more sure about, is that we can tell the full story 
about what ought to be the case without recourse to attributing obligations to 
non-collectives. Mutual responsiveness increases the chances of successful 
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avoidance of harm; it makes the world better. But responsiveness is a property of 
an individual: she has it when she notices that a desirable end could be produced 
only by several people acting together, and she coordinates her own actions 
around what she sees others doing. A responsive student notices that other stu-
dents are gathering and painting signs for the protest, she joins them and takes 
up the task of attaching the finished signs to long pieces of wood in order to make 
them into placards. Nobody needed to direct her to do so, she simply looked at 
what was being done and what needed to be done and made a judgement about 
where her efforts would be most useful. When several responsive individuals are 
clustered together and a triggering situation arises, mutual responsiveness will 
likely result in successful group action. If we want to see more successful group 
action on climate change, or poverty, or humanitarian intervention, we either 
need to work towards being more mutually responsive (and making others more 
mutually responsive), or we need to work towards there being more coordinated 
groups, capable of action in their own right.9 The latter strikes me as slightly more 
reliable, for the reasons already given that sometimes the roles are not clear and 
coordination is needed. But exactly what we do not need is to simply claim that 
non-collectives have obligations. This will be unhelpful when this does not tell 
any member of such a group what to do, and it will be unnecessary when the 
evaluative picture together with the dispositions of the relevant persons already 
make it likely that action will be forthcoming (see also discussion in Collins 2013).
5   Action, Responsibility, and Normative Symmetry
The second sequence of reasoning that seems to vindicate non-collectives’ obli-
gations goes as follows. One of the things that creates forward-looking respon-
sibility, i.e. the responsibility to discharge particular duties or obligations, is 
backward-looking responsibility, i.e. causation of or causal contribution to the 
states of affairs the duties or obligations are aimed at remedying.10 Individuals 
9 Here the ‘we’ is those who care about securing the morally relevant ends, e.g. mitigating and 
adapting to climate change, alleviating poverty, intervening militarily on humanitarian grounds 
when doing so is necessary. I have not said that there are duties to work towards mutual respon-
siveness, or there being more coordinated groups, for their own sake. I have said only that if there 
are duties relevant to the end of mitigating and adapting to climate change, they are not duties 
of non-collective groups, but rather duties of individuals, to be more responsive, or to take steps 
toward collectivising (see further discussion in Section 6).
10 Forward-looking responsibility may be created by other things too; here I need only that cau-
sation of harm is one of those things. See discussion in Miller (2007).
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can have obligations (I will switch to using ‘responsibility’ for the backward-look-
ing and ‘obligation’ for the forward-looking in order to avoid confusion between 
the two) as a result of what they have caused, even when they lacked the relevant 
kind of control over what they caused. So too for non-collective groups. Some out-
comes can only be produced by the cumulative actions of individuals, and when 
those outcomes are produced, the non-collectives who produced them can have 
obligations as a result of what they have caused. But responsibility (retrospective) 
and obligation in virtue of causation (prospective) are symmetrical: one cannot 
have an obligation as a result of performing an action that one had no obligation 
not to perform. If the non-collective is responsible, then it had an obligation. It is 
responsible, therefore it had an obligation. University students failed to protest 
and the fees went up; they are responsible (as a non-collective group) for the fees 
going up; therefore they must have had an obligation to protest against the fees 
going up. Again, we seem to have indicated a non-collective’s obligation.
The first thing we need, to get this idea off the ground, is a permissive account 
of action, such that the cumulative actions of individuals can count together as a 
single action. Frank Jackson has argued that a number of actions performed by dis-
tinct individuals can in some cases be considered together to be an action (Jackson 
1987, p. 93), so for him there is no problem in describing groups of individuals’ 
actions themselves as actions. Sara Chant’s discussion of unintentional collective 
action supports non-collectives’ actions, with several persuasive examples (Chant 
2007, p. 249–250). Peter Dalton (1993) argues for ‘extended action’, actions made 
up of sub-actions performed over an extended temporal or geographical period. 
Philip Pettit and David Schweikard propose conditions for ‘joint action’ (2006, 
p. 23–24). On their analysis, joint actions are actions performed by groups whose 
members have certain beliefs and intentions. So long as a non-collective group 
is composed of members who each satisfy the relevant belief and intention con-
ditions, there will be joint actions attributable to the non-collective group itself, 
where there is not necessarily also collective agency (2006, p. 23, 33, and 35).11
The second thing we need is an answer to the question of whether responsi-
bility (backward-looking) is premised on mere causation, or causation plus some 
further thing (such as control). Considering only the case of individual human 
agents for a moment, this question has been divisive in discussions of moral luck. 
Are individuals responsible for everything they cause, even if they were asleep, 
temporarily insane, blinded by a jealous rage, drugged, stressed, framed by 
11 Note that one consequence of being permissive in this way about the application of the term 
‘action’ will be that action and control come apart in a way they might not have on a restricted 
linguistic usage, which may have serious implications for responsibility. See also (Held 1970, 
p. 476).
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others, overtired, misled, drunk, non-culpably ignorant…? The question has lead 
Michael Zimmerman, for example, to propose a distinction between the ‘scope’ 
and the ‘degree’ of responsibility for what persons bring about, where two persons 
behaving identically may end up with responsibility of the same degree (indexed 
to control) but differing scope (indexed to outcomes) (Zimmerman 2002).
If we think control matters, we will think two individuals with responsibil-
ity of very different scope (let us say both fired their guns, but only one of their 
bullets hit and killed the intended victim, so one is responsible in scope for a 
death, the other only for an attempt) nonetheless have responsibility of the same 
degree, namely for that part of the world they exercised control over: the firing of 
the gun at their victims with the intention of killing them (Lewis 1989). If we think 
causation is all that matters, we will think the two individuals have responsibility 
of very different degree: one is responsible for a death, one for an attempt. This 
would presumably legitimise differential blame and punishment (as in fact we 
actually see in practice in most modern legal systems).
So far, we have several accounts of action permissive enough to count clus-
ters of actions that bring about particular outcomes (usually those that involve 
harm, or fail to avert harm) as non-collectives’ actions, and we have an account of 
responsibility that tracks causation alone – say, the causation involved in a non-
collective’s action bringing about a harmful outcome. Does this get us all the way 
to non-collectives’ obligations? Before I answer that (but to kill the suspense, the 
answer is ‘no!’) let us put the issue in terms of a case, to bring out the important 
elements of the question more clearly.
Imagine that one hundred different individuals on one hundred consecutive 
days drop litter into a very small lake, and by the hundredth day the fish popu-
lation is finally killed off by the pollution. Making use of Jackson’s or Dalton’s 
accounts of actions (Pettit and Schweikard’s account is much stronger and will 
exclude this case), we can say the non-collective group of those hundred individ-
uals ‘polluted the lake’, and thereby brought about the outcome of having ‘killed 
off the fish population’. Making use of the ‘causation alone’ account of responsi-
bility, we can say that the non-collective group is responsible for what it did. But 
this raises two interesting questions, one of which is problematic enough to be a 
reason to reject the claim that there is responsibility in such a case.
The first question is what the non-collective group’s responsibility means for 
those who compose the non-collective. Surely, given that none of the hundred 
individuals were acting in full knowledge of each other’s actions or with the 
intention to kill off the fish population (let us say they had good reason to think 
they were the only one littering in that way), they cannot be held equally respon-
sible (i.e. dividing the overall harm of the loss of the fish population between the 
hundred of them in blaming, or punishing, or seeking reparation). It seems that 
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the only permissible distribution of responsibility back to the non-collective’s 
constituents is proportional to each constituent’s contribution. But in that case 
we did not need the story about what the non-collective did, and what the non-
collective is responsible for. Each person is responsible for what she did, but that 
does not add up to the sum total of what the non-collective caused. (In other 
words, each of the hundred is responsible for littering, but the blame, punish-
ment, and reparation appropriate to littering will very likely not add up to be 
proportional, in total, to the killing off of the fish population, which is a perma-
nent future deprivation for those who would have made use of the lake). Non-
collectives’ obligations do not add anything worth having.
The second question is whether the symmetry between responsibility for 
actions and obligations not to perform those actions does not rather imply that 
we made a mistake in attributing responsibility. If there is symmetry, then when-
ever there is responsibility for an action after the fact, there will also have been an 
obligation to not have performed that action before the fact. And in reverse, wher-
ever there is an obligation not to perform an action, there is responsibility for 
having performed it if that obligation is violated. The case for symmetry strikes 
me as strong: it is unfair to hold a person accountable (to blame her, to punish 
her, to require reparation from her) for an action that she had no obligation not 
to perform. Thus when we suspect responsibility, we should assume also obliga-
tion, and then have a look to see whether that would have been plausible. The 
non-collective presented above polluted the lake and killed off the fish popula-
tion. It seems it is responsible for that. But that would mean it had an obligation 
not to pollute the lake and thereby kill off the fish stock. But what ‘it’ is that? 
There was just an uncoordinated group of individuals, acting independently 
and unilaterally, who just happened to engage in similar enough behaviour at a 
similar enough time and place, that their actions taken together caused a harmful 
outcome – the pollution of the lake and collapse of the fish population. The only 
things in the vicinity capable of bearing obligations are the individual constitu-
ents of the non-collective. Thus by modus tollens, there is no responsibility in 
this case. Precisely: if there is responsibility, then there is obligation. There is no 
obligation (by ought implies can, no bearer of the obligation so no capability of 
fulfilling it) therefore there is no responsibility.12
12 An alternative to denying that there is an obligation, compatible with the symmetry argu-
ment, is to say that there is an obligation in virtue of other features. All that is precluded by the 
symmetry argument is that there is an obligation in virtue of there being responsibility (causa-
tion). That leaves open that the non-collective has the obligation because it is ‘best-placed’. Of 
course, I would deny that it can have the obligation in virtue of these other features, because the 
fact that it lacks control would preclude those equally. But the possibility is there.
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Of course, the way to get around this is to reject symmetry (see discussion in 
Miller 2007). Then we get an obligation not to perform an action without being 
committed to there being responsibility for having performed that action; and 
vice versa, if we want it, responsibility for having performed an action without 
being committed to there having been an obligation to not have performed it. 
Without a commitment to symmetry, the critic of non-collectives’ obligations 
would not be forced to either deny there is responsibility in order to deny there 
was an obligation (as I am), or explain the obligation in virtue of some other fea-
tures (although I would deny non-collectives’ obligations tout court for all the 
reasons explained so far). Those engaged in the debate over moral luck (e.g. Zim-
merman 2002) believe there is responsibility even when there is no control. But 
they do not say much about whether there were obligations not to perform the 
actions for which there is then responsibility. Whether or not they explicitly reject 
symmetry, they appear to have failed to notice that there is a strong case for it.
Those who think that our moral obligations are subjective, tied to our epis-
temic states (or our ‘reasonable’ epistemic states), will deny that there are any 
obligations under many of the conditions I mentioned above, such as temporary 
insanity, non-culpable ignorance, or having been drugged. Those who think our 
moral obligations are objective, and hold regardless of what we know or believe, 
may allow that there are obligations under these kinds of conditions (on this dis-
tinction see discussion in Smith 2010a,b). They can excuse the violation of objec-
tive obligations in some cases, and they can explain responsibility as present in 
those cases where an excuse is not available. But it seems that in application 
to the non-collective presented above, there would be a pretty good case for 
excusing, namely something approximating non-culpable ignorance seems to 
be present in the fact that the non-collective’s constituents were not organised, 
acted independently and unilaterally, did not expect that others would be acting 
in the same way, did not assign a high credence to the proposition that their own 
littering would be an actual cause of the eventual pollution of the lake and col-
lapse of the fish population, and so on. So even accepting asymmetry (although 
I think we should not) does not put non-collectives’ obligations on solid ground. 
On a subjective reading there would be no obligations because there is a func-
tional equivalent of non-culpable epistemic failure (the group is not an epistemic 
agent so this is hardly surprising); on an objective reading even a pro tanto obliga-
tion would likely be excused, for the same reason.
In summary, although we might want to attribute actions to non-collectives 
under certain conditions, we are not entitled to move from actions to obligations. 
Some actions eventuate without being produced in the way we usually think nec-
essary for obligation, e.g. control, or reliable production. In such cases, we might 
agree of the action that the non-collective produced it, without agreeing that the 
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non-collective ought not to have produced it. Each individual constituent of a 
non-collective can be obliged not to perform certain actions, both uncondition-
ally, and conditional upon her beliefs about what the others will do, depending 
on the case, but the individuals together (the non-collective) cannot be obliged 
to not perform certain actions, or not bring about certain outcomes, because they 
(it) cannot; there is no infrastructure for coordination, or organisation, or even 
the mere dissemination of information.
For all the reasons just given, talk of non-collectives’ obligations is at best 
superfluous – in that it does not add anything more than talking about the obliga-
tions of each individual would – and at worst misleading, in that it perpetuates the 
idea that non-collectives can be the bearers of obligations, which in turn encour-
ages impotent solutions to major collective action problems like climate change, 
and cooperation problems like widespread poverty, in which non-collectives like 
‘the global populace’ or ‘humanity’ are ascribed an obligation to prevent global 
climate change, and to end global poverty. Such non-collectives are not able to 
act (although they are made out of things that are able); such non-collectives lack 
the control over their actions necessary for obligations (even though sometimes 
they do produce actions); and there is nothing that they ought to do, because 
there is nothing that they could do (even though in societies of mutually respon-
sive persons, there is something each could do to reliably produce the relevant 
outcome).
6  Duties to Collectivise
What is left if we dismiss the idea of non-collectives’ obligations? Where there 
are not collective agents, we should be clear about the obligations that exist – for 
individuals – because of the goods that could be pursued if there were. I have 
already mentioned that one solution to failures of joint action in cases where joint 
action could secure morally important goods is to work to increase our respon-
siveness to one another, to work toward making sure that social values (and thus 
what counts as a violation of those values) and the roles necessary to resolving 
a violation are well-publicised. When individuals are willing to act together and 
they know what they each need to do in order to secure a joint outcome, all we 
need is a triggering event to get joint action off the ground. This solution will 
be good enough some of the time, but as I said earlier, it does not work in cases 
where the roles are diverse and complicated, where coordination or organisation 
are required, and where the values are not settled or violations are non-obvious. 
For that reason, it is worth thinking about an alternative solution. I will develop 
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the  suggestion in Collins (2013) that individuals have duties to take steps to col-
lectivise, in the first instance. First we must take steps to bring into existence the 
kinds of groups that can reliably produce desirable outcomes; then those groups 
will come to bear obligations to act in pursuit of morally important goods (such 
as the mitigation of climate change, and the alleviation of widespread poverty) – 
and these obligations will in turn have implications for the groups’ members. 
The kinds of groups that can reliably produce desirable outcomes are collective 
agents. Duties to take steps to collectivise are duties to work towards the creation 
of collective agents.13
These are obligations that fall upon individuals, to take steps towards col-
lectivising, e.g. by signaling conditional willingness to cooperate (Lawford-Smith 
forthcoming(a)), acting as a trigger or responding to another’s triggering when 
others have signaled conditional willingness (this step takes us from willingness 
to action), persuading, remonstrating, and motivating others to take individual 
steps towards collectivising. Once a collective agent is brought into existence, it 
can use formal and informal mechanisms to distribute roles to members jointly 
sufficient for seeing its obligations fulfilled. In terms of outcome, there is no disa-
greement with Wringe (2014),14 who is one of the most vigorous defenders of non-
collectives’ bearing of obligations. But the way of getting there is very different. 
Wringe thinks the non-collective group that is the global community bears an 
obligation to secure the subsistence rights of the poor, and that this obligation 
distributes to the members of that group – everyone, everywhere – in one of two 
ways, one of which is to coordinate in the way required to allow the fulfilling of 
others’ subsistence rights (Wringe 2014). These are essentially individuals’ obli-
gations to collectivise, but on Wringe’s story such obligations are grounded in 
the obligations of the wider group, whereas on my story (and also that of Collins 
2013) such obligations are grounded in the good that could be secured were there 
groups capable of acting in particular ways.
A defender of non-collectives’ obligations might be less than enthusiastic 
about replacing non-collectives’ obligations with individuals’ collectivisation 
duties, for at least three reasons. First of all, there is something deeply morally 
problematic about our response to challenges like climate change, or in the way 
we fail to respond to urgent situations when we find ourselves among other 
capable persons who are not responding. If all the projected harms of climate 
change come to pass, or if a person is beaten to death in front of twenty witnesses 
13 Although they can also be duties to join, reform, and check existing collective agents or their 
goals and procedures. See discussion in Collins and Lawford-Smith (forthcoming).
14 Although there is a serious disagreement with Wringe (2010), which argues that those who 
bear obligations are not necessarily those responsible for fulfilling them.
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any combination of which could have helped, we somehow want to be able to say 
that many people failed together, that there is something they could have done as 
a group that would have avoided those negative outcomes. If all we can say is that 
many individuals failed in their individual duties to collectivise, it seems like we 
miss our target. What has gone wrong in the world is that there has been avoid-
able suffering, not that persons merely failed to, e.g. signal to one another in the 
ways that they should have.
The critic of non-collectives’ obligations – me! – has to bite this bullet. We are 
still able to make evaluative claims, e.g. to lament the fact that there has been suf-
fering. But we are not permitted the prefix ‘avoidable’, because we do not think 
that there was any agent (or non-agent for that matter) under whose control the 
outcome fell. That means the only normative claims we can make are attributions 
to individuals of collectivisation duties (or attributions of responsibility in light of 
their failure to act upon those duties). I suspect the fact that this is so dissatisfy-
ing is exactly what has lead theorists to propose non-collectives’ obligations. But 
dissatisfaction does not justify saying something false.
Second of all, the motivation for believing collective obligations to be dis-
junctive once distributed to members (in the way defended at greater length in 
Lawford-Smith 2012) might be thought to apply equally to collectivisation duties. 
The critic of non-collectives’ obligations must resist ascribing unconditional 
duties to individuals when there is some good that could be pursued were all 
such individuals to have (and fulfill) categorical duties. That is because in many 
of these kinds of cases, what any one individual ought to do depends on what the 
others do. But so too for collectivisation duties. Collins (2013) acknowledges that 
an individual cannot ‘collectivise’ alone (that is why she talks in terms of the duty 
to take steps towards collectivising, and why I have been careful to unpack col-
lectivisation duties in more detail here as duties to signal, to trigger, to persuade). 
But there is more to this objection than that observation. The idea is that just as 
duties to perform a part of a collective action must depend on whether others will 
do their respective parts, so too must collectivisation duties. Just as there is no 
point forming the first link in a human chain to rescue a drowning person in the 
knowledge that others will not come and complete the chain, there is no point 
signaling conditional willingness to cooperate in the knowledge that others will 
not signal their own.
There are two responses to this worry. The first is that there is a conceptual 
difference between the two. Individuals cannot produce particular collective out-
comes alone, while they can fulfill the duties related to collectivising alone. There 
may well be situations in which an individual should not fulfill those duties, for 
example when the costs of doing so would far outweigh the benefits, or when the 
case has been rigged so that the collective action will surely fail if she performs the 
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actions (imagine that if she signals conditional willingness to cooperate she will 
be shot, a situation which is actually close to reality in e.g. forced labour camps 
or under political regimes with dense networks of spies). But she can perform her 
collectivisation duties in a way that she often cannot perform the action-disjunct 
of her distributed collective obligations.
The second is that discharging individual duties to collectivise is significantly 
cheaper than discharging distributed collective obligations (again focusing on 
the action-disjunct). Signaling conditional willingness might be as cheap and 
easy as nodding your head in response to another’s raised eyebrow, or adding 
your name to an online coordination forum. The fact that they are so cheap and 
easy to discharge means that there will be fewer occasions for failure to discharge 
them (fewer instances in which as pro tanto ‘oughts’ they are weighed up against 
others and yet do not emerge as the all-things-considered ought; less instances in 
which as all-things-considered oughts their fulfillment would come at dispropor-
tionate cost, entailing that failure to fulfill them would be excused).
Finally, why think that the fulfillment of collectivisation duties is likely to 
lead to the existence of a collective, and subsequently to collective action? One 
need only be moderately sceptical about the prospects of interpersonal coopera-
tion to think that all relevant individuals could discharge their duties related to 
collectivisation and nonetheless there could fail to be a collective or collective 
action. Well-intentioned and willing-in-principle individuals might still fail to 
agree upon the collective’s aims, or on a way of distributing roles to members, 
or about which members should take a leadership role. We might all be willing 
in principle to intervene upon an assault to save a victim’s life, but none of us is 
willing to be the person to get closest to the assailant, in case we get seriously 
physically hurt. In some situations there are natural leaders – individuals with 
more charisma, or authority, or forcefulness of character. But in other situations 
there are not, and in those it seems that even if all relevant individuals signaled 
their willingness to cooperate, and one such individual triggered that willingness 
into action, there might still be anarchy with respect to what the group should 
actually do, and how it is to be done.
In response, I think a proponent of collectivisation duties must concede that 
they are not a surefire way to secure collective action. The more structure there is 
already in place, the more likely it is that the fulfillment of collectivisation duties 
will lead to collective action, e.g. a constitution or manifesto, established social 
norms that dictate which roles must be filled for the performance of a given task, 
processes for the election of leaders or executive subgroups, clear and specific 
ends. It also seems that the more flexible potential members are, the better (the 
failure imagined here is largely a result of strong personalities failing to agree 
on how collective ends should be secured). The less structure there is already 
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in place, and the less flexible potential members are, the less likely it is that the 
discharging of collectivisation duties will lead to collective action. There might 
be ways to strengthen the account of collectivisation duties so that their fulfill-
ment more reliably produces collective action, but it is hard to see exactly how 
these would go (for example, a duty to ‘be more flexible’ is unappealing, first of 
all because it is about what persons should be like rather than what they should 
do, and second of all because if all persons in a group were maximally flexible 
there would arise just the same problem as if all persons were maximally inflex-
ible, namely nothing would get done). It would be useful to think more about the 
mutual responsiveness mentioned in the last section to this end, because that 
only requires an initial actor, around whom others can coordinate their actions.
7  Conclusion
There are better and worse motivations for attributing obligations to non-col-
lectives. The worse motivations simply fail to see an alternative way of account-
ing for the obvious moral importance of persons acting together against certain 
harms than to attribute obligations to act to the non-collective itself. The better 
motivations simply assume that because (on some theories) there is non-collec-
tive action, there is also non-collective responsibility and – by symmetry – non-
collective obligation; or because there is action, and in some cases even reliable 
action, there is candidacy for obligation, and in combination with desirability, 
actual obligation. But the better motivations make important mistakes, and the 
worse motivations are unnecessary because there is an alternative way to theorise 
about the obligations that exist in light of goods that could be produced were 
there collective agents, or were there mutual responsiveness of the right kind 
within a population. That is to think about individuals’ duties to collectivise.
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